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DOUBLE, DOUBLE, TOIL AND TROUBLE:
JUSTICE-TALK AND THE FUTURE OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
David A. Hyman & Charles Silver*

I said there is no justice as they led me out the door
And the Judge said
“This isn’t a court of justice, son.
This is a court of law.”1
INTRODUCTION
It’s not easy being a lawyer. “Biglaw” may not be dead (yet), but
major firms have dissolved, filed for bankruptcy, and shed partners
and practice groups.2 Small and mid-sized firms and solo practitioners
are facing similar challenges. Some of these developments are attributable to the financial crisis and the Great Recession. Others are the
result of structural and technological changes affecting the market for
legal services—and those changes have revealed new weaknesses in
the business forms through which lawyers have traditionally delivered
legal services.
To most inhabitants of Biglaw, these changes and challenges are unprecedented, but to lawyers who do medical malpractice and personal
injury litigation, market turbulence of this sort is old hat. Over the
past three decades, there have been dramatic changes in the market
(and demand) for such services. Some of these changes are clearly
attributable to legislative action. For example, many states have made
lawsuits less profitable for victims of malpractice and their lawyers by
capping noneconomic or total damages. States have also made these
lawsuits more expensive by putting procedural hurdles (including
screening panels, certification requirements, and interlocutory appeals
of expert witness reports) in the path that plaintiffs must follow to
* David A. Hyman is H. Ross & Helen Workman Chair in Law and Professor of Medicine,
University of Illinois. Tel. 217-333-0061, e-mail: dhyman@illinois.edu. Charles Silver is McDonald Endowed Chair in Civil Procedure, University of Texas Law School. Tel. 512-232-1337, email: csilver@law.utexas.edu.
1. BILLY BRAGG, Rotting on Remand, on WORKERS PLAYTIME (Elektra/Asylum Records
1988).
2. Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 751.
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secure a recovery. The negative impact of these initiatives on litigation rates was predictable. But, even in states that have not taken
such sweeping steps, there has been a long-term secular decline in the
volume of medical malpractice litigation.
Apart from the highly visible public brawl over the merits of damage caps, these developments have attracted little attention. However, the dynamics are clear to those who wish to pay attention to
them. In this Article, we explore these trends, highlight the ways in
which they have interacted with one another, and then briefly discuss
why it is not helpful to analyze these developments in terms of their
impact on “access to justice.” Part II identifies five developments that
have affected the economics of plaintiff-side medical malpractice litigation—all in the direction of making such cases less remunerative.
Part III explains why, despite routine practice to the contrary, we
should stop talking about these developments in terms of their impact
on “access to justice.” Part IV concludes.
II. FIVE FACTORS THAT HAVE AFFECTED THE ECONOMICS
PLAINTIFF-SIDE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION

OF

A. Damage Caps
Damage caps have been the most popular tort reform of the twentieth century (and, so far, the twenty-first century). As we have detailed elsewhere, roughly thirty states have adopted a diverse array of
damage caps.3 Some states cap only noneconomic damages. Some
states cap total damages. Some states cap both. The severity of these
caps varies, depending on the absolute dollar amount of the cap,
whether it is adjusted for inflation (and if not, when the cap was enacted), and whether it varies by the number and type of defendants.
Table 1 shows a breakdown of the caps that are in effect as of June
2013.

3. David A. Hyman, Bernard Black, Charles Silver & William M. Sage, Estimating the Effect
of Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice Cases: Evidence from Texas, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 355,
356 (2009).
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TABLE 1: STATUTORY DAMAGE CAPS4
State (*inflation
adjusted)

Cap Type

Cap Level

Louisiana

Total

$500k plus future medical expenses

New Mexico

Total

$600k plus future medical expenses

Colorado

Total
Noneconomic

$1M total; $300k noneconomic

Indiana

Total

$1.25M

Massachusetts

Total (hospitals), $20k total (nonprofit hospitals); $500k noneconomic
Noneconomic
(all defendants)
(all)

Nebraska

Total

$1.75M

Virginia*

Total

$1.95M

California
Idaho*
Kansas
Montana

Noneconomic

$250k

Oklahoma*

Noneconomic

$300k

West Virginia*

Noneconomic

$250k, except $500k in death cases

Missouri

Noneconomic

$330k

Texas

Noneconomic

$250k–$750k, depending on number and type of
defendants

Nevada

Noneconomic

$350k

Ohio

Noneconomic

Greater of $250k or (3x economic damages, up to
$500k)

Hawaii

Noneconomic

$375k

Alaska

Noneconomic

$400k

Utah*

Noneconomic

$409k

Michigan*

Noneconomic

$641k

Georgia
South Carolina

Noneconomic

$350k–$1.05M, depending on number and type of
defendants

Mississippi
North Dakota
South Dakota

Noneconomic

$500k

Maryland*

Noneconomic

$650k

Florida

Noneconomic

$500k ($1M in death and other serious injury cases)

Wisconsin

Noneconomic

$750k

Do these damage caps matter? If so, how much do they matter? Do
they simply reduce payouts per claim, or do they also affect claim volume by making small-value claims less remunerative? Figure 1, drawn
from other work we have done using Texas closed claims data, shows
4. Id. at 393–94 tbl. 11.
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the impact of Texas’s moderately strict 2003 cap on noneconomic
damages.5
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FIGURE 16 TIME TRENDS IN TEXAS MED MAL CLAIMS
PAYOUTS, 1990–2010
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As Figure 1 reflects, we observe a 61% decline in paid claims, and a
45% decline in payouts per capita during the post-reform period (i.e.,
comparing 2009 with 2003). Since plaintiffs’ lawyers generally charge
a contingency fee of one-third of the amount recovered, the combined
effect is a 75% reduction in the amount of money received by plaintiffs—and a comparable reduction in the fees received by their lawyers. Other work has similarly shown that damage caps have a
substantial impact on claiming and payouts, although the evidence is
less clear for studies that do not account for tort reform’s phase-in
effects.7
5. See David A. Hyman, Charles Silver, Bernard S. Black & Myungho Paik, Does Tort Reform Affect Physician Supply? Evidence from Texas 7 fig. 1 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, Law,
Behavior, and Social Science Research Papers Series, Research Paper No. LBSS12-12, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2047433.
6. Claims per 100,000 population by year for all claimants (left-axis), and payouts per capita
(right-axis), for 14,995 non-duplicate, non-nursing-home, medical malpractice cases closed from
1990–2009 with payout > $25,000 in 1988 dollars. Texas tort reform in 2003 is depicted by the
vertical line. Amounts are in 2008 dollars.
7. See Myungho Paik, Bernard Black & David A. Hyman, The Receding Tide of Medical Malpractice Litigation: Part 2—Effect of Damage Caps, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 639 (2013).
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B. Caps on Attorney Fees
Caps on attorney fees have attracted far less attention than damage
caps, but sixteen states have adopted them. Cap design varies, but
most provide that lawyers can only charge a declining contingency fee
as the size of the recovery increases. Table 2 provides a brief summary of the fee caps in each state and for claims brought pursuant to
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).
TABLE 2: STATUTORY CAPS
State

ON

CONTINGENCY FEES8

Fee-Limit Rule

California

Sliding scale, not to exceed 40% of first $50,000; 1/3 of next $50,000; 25%
of next $500,000; and 15% of damages exceeding $600,000

Connecticut

Sliding scale, not to exceed 1/3 of first $300,000; 25% of next $300,000;
20% of next $300,000; 15% of next $300,000; and 10% of damages
exceeding $1.2 million

Delaware

Sliding scale, not to exceed 35% of the first $100,000 recovered; 25% of
the next $100,000; and 10% of the balance

Florida

Sliding scale, not to exceed 30% of first $250,000; 10% of any award over
$250,000

Illinois

1/3 of amount recovered (in effect since 2013). Previously, sliding scale on
medical malpractice cases, not to exceed 1/3 of first $150,000; 25% of
$150,000 to $1 million; 20% of damages over $1 million

Indiana

No limit on first $250,000; no more than 15% on amounts above $250,000

Maine

Sliding scale, not to exceed 1/3 of first $100,000; 25% of next $100,000; and
20% of damages exceeding $200,000

Massachusetts Sliding scale, not to exceed 40% of first $150,000; 1/3 of next $150,000;
30% of next $200,000; and 25% of award over $500,000
Michigan

1/3 of amount recovered

Nevada

Sliding scale, not to exceed 40% of first $50,000; 1/3 of next $50,000; 25%
of next $500,000; 15% of any amount over $600,000

New Jersey

Sliding scale, not to exceed 1/3 of first $500,000; 30% of next $500,000;
25% of third $500,000; and 20% of fourth $500,000

New York

Sliding scale, not to exceed 30% of first $250,000; 25% of second $250,000;
20% of next $500,000; 15% of next $250,000; 10% over $1.25 million

Oklahoma

50% of net judgment

Tennessee

1/3 of award

Utah

1/3 of award

Wisconsin

Sliding scale, not to exceed 1/3 of first $1 million; 20% of any amount
exceeding $1 million

FTCA

20% of administrative settlements, and 25% of a judgment or compromise
after suit is filed

8. David A. Hyman, Bernard Black & Charles Silver, The Economics of Plaintiff-Side
Personal Injury Practice 10 tbl. 2 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, Law, Behavior, and Social Science
Research Papers Series, Research Paper No. LBSS13-28, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1441487.
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We have been unable to locate any empirical research quantifying
the impact of these fee caps. In other work, using a dataset comprised
of plaintiff-side personal injury firms located in diverse states, we
found that the probable impact of these fee caps would vary greatly,
depending on both the details of cap design and the portfolio of cases
handled by the firm.9 Table 3 summarizes the “haircut” that the three
of the firms in our dataset (located in Illinois, Texas, and an undisclosed third state) would take if the caps imposed by three states (California, Florida, and pre-2013 Illinois) had been applied to all of their
cases.
TABLE 3: IMPACT

OF

FEE CAPS

Firm

ON

FIRM REVENUE10

Fee Cap
California

Florida

Illinois
(pre-2013)

Illinois Firm

27%

45%

18%

Texas Firm

26%

40%

19%

7%

17%

5%

Firm in Undisclosed State

As Table 3 makes clear, a fee cap can have dramatically different effects when it is applied to firms with different case portfolios. California’s fee cap reduces the third firm’s fees by only 7%, but it reduces
the fees for the Illinois and Texas firms by 27% and 26%, respectively—meaning there is more than a four-fold difference in the haircut on fees imposed on these firms by the same fee cap. Similarly,
different fee caps can have dramatically different impacts when they
are applied to the same firm. For example, the Texas firm would see a
19% haircut on its fees from the Illinois cap, but a 40% haircut from
the Florida cap.
To be sure, Table 3 oversimplifies matters. The fee caps only apply
to medical malpractice cases. But the firms we studied handled diverse types of cases, some of which did not involve medical malpractice. Because we applied the cap to all cases alike, our results
overstate the likely impact of the fee caps. We also assume that fee
caps do not affect case volume or case mix (i.e., we assume that firms
continue to represent the same clients and seek the same damages)
but that assumption is obviously unrealistic. By making cases less remunerative, fee caps discourage lawyers from taking some (or many)
cases they would have otherwise accepted. The assumption of “no
impact on case selection” biases our results downward. We think it
9. See id. at 3, 25–26.
10. Id. at 23 tbl. 10.
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likely that the volume or case selection effect is larger than the nonmedical malpractice case cap effect. If so, Table 3 underestimates the
impact of fee caps on firm revenue.
Fee caps and damage caps are designed to bite hard only in the
largest cases—and such cases typically constitute only a small fraction
of plaintiffs’ firms’ dockets. So, why do fee caps and damage caps
have such a large impact? The business model for plaintiffs’ firms
provides an obvious answer. For the law firms we have studied, and
for firms studied by others, a minority of very large cases accounts for
an enormous fraction of total revenues. The top 10% of cases handled by a plaintiff’s firm (based on the amount of the recovery) can
account for 50% or more of the firm’s entire revenue. Policies that
make these cases significantly less remunerative destabilize the basic
economics of these firms and, more generally, of plaintiff-side
practice.
C. Secular Decline
Apart from the developments mentioned above, in other research
we found a long-term secular decline in the frequency of medical malpractice litigation, even in states that have not adopted caps on damages or fees.11 Between 2001 and 2012, we found a 50% decline in
claim frequency (paid claims per 1000 physicians) in states that did not
have a cap in effect during this period, compared to a 62% decline in
states that adopted caps during the 1990s, and a 47% decline in states
that adopted caps during the 1970s and 1980s.12 Thus, for reasons that
have nothing to do with tort reform, we are seeing fewer paid medical
malpractice claims, even as health care spending and treatment intensity rise inexorably.
D. Subrogation
Subrogation has had an increasingly significant impact on the economics of plaintiff-side litigation. Subrogation allows a plaintiff’s
health insurer (including Medicare, Medicaid, and workers’ compensation insurers) to recoup the amounts they paid to (or on behalf of)
the injured plaintiff from funds received in settlement of the plaintiff’s
tort claim. The logic of subrogation is straightforward. Health insurers advance funds to pay for the cost of treating patients injured by
negligence. When patients sue for medical malpractice, the damages
11. Myungho Paik, Bernard Black & David A. Hyman, The Receding Tide of Medical Malpractice Litigation: Part 1—National Trends, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 612 (2013).
12. Id. at 618 tbl. 1. States that adopted caps in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s are starting from a
lower baseline; the percentage decline is relative to that lower baseline.
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they recover reflect (in whole or in part) the cost of the additional
medical services they required because of the malpractice. If patients
kept all the money, they would be reimbursed for costs that were actually borne by someone else—namely, their first-party health care insurer. This would be inequitable and would also make first-party
coverage more expensive than it would be if payers were reimbursed.
Consequently, first-party insurers use their contracts to step into the
shoes of injured patients and recover their losses.
This description of insurer subrogation seems simple and intuitively
obvious, but it masks a dynamic that makes litigation progressively
less remunerative for injured patients and their lawyers. Throughout
the United States and over many decades, health care costs have risen
dramatically. By contrast, the amount of liability insurance health
care providers carry to cover malpractice claims has not kept pace.13
In real dollars, malpractice coverage has declined, and it continues to
be eroded by inflation. Because medical malpractice cases rarely settle for amounts that exceed providers’ primary policy limits, rising
medical costs and diminishing policy limits whipsaw injured patients,
who find less and less money left over after reimbursing their firstparty insurers.
This development has predictable effects. First, plaintiffs with large
subrogated damages are less likely to pursue litigation, since they will
be left with little to show for their lawsuit after their lawyer and the
subrogated insurer are paid. Second, plaintiffs’ lawyers will become
reluctant to take cases with large subrogated damages. This is due, in
part, to the costs and uncertainties of dealing with subrogated insurers
who have no preexisting contractual obligation to pay the lawyer for
securing the funds they receive. Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ norms also cut
against taking such cases. Plaintiffs’ attorneys see their mission as recovering compensation for injured people. They do not see themselves as subrogation lawyers for insurers, and they are reluctant to
take cases when they know there is little they can do to help their
clients.
E. Attacking the Expert
Medical malpractice litigation relies on expert testimony. Steps that
reduce the supply of physicians who are willing and able to serve as
experts or that otherwise increase the cost of those experts’ services
13. See Kathryn Zeiler, Charles Silver, Bernard Black, David A. Hyman & William M. Sage,
Physicians’ Insurance Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evidence from Texas Closed Claims,
1990–2003, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S9, S10 (2007).

2014]

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION

555

will affect the costs and feasibility of litigating the underlying malpractice cases. Three strategies have been used to attack the expert: statutory restrictions on who can serve as an expert, interlocutory appeals
when an expert is accepted by the trial court but the defendant wants
to challenge that decision, and professional discipline against those
with the temerity to offer testimony on behalf of injured plaintiffs.
We address each of these strategies in turn.
1. Limitations on Who Can Be an Expert
Who can testify as an expert? In Alabama, the expert must be licensed in the same specialty as the defendant.14 In Tennessee, the
expert has to come from Tennessee or an adjoining state.15 In West
Virginia, experts must devote at least 60% of their time to clinical
practice or teaching at an accredited university.16 Such restrictions,
over and above the generic requirement that one “has to know
enough about the subject area to qualify as an expert,” reduce the
supply of those able to serve as experts. In the limiting case, it may be
impossible for a plaintiffs’ attorney to find a doctor who is ready, willing, and able to testify as an expert. Short of that, legislative measures
that reduce supply enable physicians who qualify as experts under the
more restrictive criteria to charge higher fees. This increases plaintiffs’ attorneys’ out-of-pocket costs, making plaintiff-side litigation
riskier and less profitable.
2. Interlocutory Appeals
Texas requires the submission of an expert report within 120 days of
the initiation of a malpractice suit—and since 2007, has allowed defendants to file an interlocutory appeal challenging the validity of the
expert report.17 If the trial court accepts the expert report, defendants
are allowed to file an immediate appeal, to argue that the proffered
expert does not actually qualify to offer expert testimony, or to argue
that the proffered report does not otherwise satisfy the statutory
requirements.
In general, interlocutory appeals are strongly disfavored, since they
increase costs without much in the way of commensurate benefits.
Unless we believe the costs of a false positive (i.e., allowing a malpractice case to go forward when it should not have) are comparable to the
costs of erroneously certifying a class action, it is hard to conclude that
14.
15.
16.
17.

ALA. CODE § 6-5-548(e) (2004).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-115(b) (2012).
W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-7(a) (1994).
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (West 2012).
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routine interlocutory appeals add much value in this setting. But they
do increase costs and risks for plaintiffs’ lawyers—which was probably
the point.
3. Professional Discipline
Physicians have also used professional discipline to attack those
willing to testify on behalf of plaintiffs.18 The American Association
of Neurological Surgeons (AANS) is a voluntary organization. One
of its members (Donald C. Austin) testified in a malpractice case
against another member, who then complained to the AANS. After
an investigation and hearing, the AANS suspended Austin for six
months, reasoning that he had offered irresponsible testimony and
thereby breached his professional obligations as a neurosurgeon. Discovery in the resulting lawsuit revealed that the AANS had disciplined other physicians who had testified on behalf of plaintiffs, but
had never disciplined a physician who testified on behalf of a defendant. In his usual nonchalant fashion, Judge Richard Posner dismissed
this highly salient fact and upheld summary judgment for the defendants, reasoning that the only complaints that had been made to AANS
had involved neurosurgeons who had testified for plaintiffs, so it was
unsurprising that AANS had only disciplined those who testified for
plaintiffs.19
F. Cumulative Impact of These Factors
Each of these developments affects the larger economics of plaintiff-side practice in this area. Some reduce the potential rewards directly (e.g., capping damages and fees), while others do so indirectly
(e.g., subrogation and attacking the expert). Some are both cause and
effect of larger dynamics in the litigation environment (e.g., the secular trend toward less malpractice litigation). Even those provisions
that are facially neutral seem likely to disparately impact plaintiffs.20
In combination, the effect is to change the risk–return tradeoff of
many malpractice cases. Professor Joanna Shepherd sketched out the
basic dynamic:
18. We do not address the parallel use of professional discipline to attack physicians who
serve as medical directors for managed care organizations. See, e.g., Murphy v. Bd. of Med.
Exam’rs, 949 P.2d 530, 532, 537–38 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); Morris v. D.C. Bd. of Med., 701 A.2d
364, 365 (D.C. 1997).
19. Austin v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967, 971–72 (7th Cir. 2001).
20. Of course, limitations on who can serve as an expert are facially neutral, but defendants
are more likely to be able to find a willing expert, even in the shrunken pool.
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As one attorney interviewed for my study noted: “med-mal litigation is the ‘sport of kings’ from an expense standpoint . . . the liability/damages mix must present sufficient strength in both measures
to make economic sense.” Another attorney that participated in my
survey explained that “the cake has to be worth the candle . . . I
know if expenses will be high, I won’t take the case without the
likelihood of a large recovery.”21

Eventually, plaintiffs’ attorneys get the message, and they find other
things to do with their time. When they leave, so do defense attorneys. “Starve the beast” may not actually work to constrain the
growth of government,22 but it is certainly an effective strategy for
reducing or eliminating capacity in the market for legal services.
III. JUST SAY NO

TO

JUSTICE-TALK

For many years, the American Bar Association and other worthies
have framed campaigns to improve access to the legal system in terms
of “access to justice.” Numerous studies have been done on unmet
“legal needs.” Panels and symposia have been held. Law professors
and titans of the bar have held forth on the subject. Lawyers have
tried, without much success, to establish a “civil Gideon” right to
counsel in certain types of civil cases.
What do we have to show for all this “justice-talk”? Victims of
medical malpractice cannot obtain compensation unless they hire an
attorney, or can credibly threaten to do so.23 Damage caps make
many cases non-starters, and disproportionately reduce recoveries in
the largest cases, where victims’ injuries are likely to be the most severe.24 And under-compensation and non-compensation was the rule,
even before damage caps were added to the mix.
21. Joanna Shepherd, Uncovering the Silent Victims of the American Medical Liability System,
67 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 15) (alterations in original), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2147915.
22. See, e.g., William Niskanen, Limiting Government: The Failure of “Starve the Beast,” 26
CATO J. 553 (2006); Jonathan Rauch, Stoking the Beast, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2006, at 27,
28.
23. We quantified the frequency with which pro se plaintiffs successfully used the tort system
to obtain compensation in Texas. In all five lines of commercial insurance in our dataset, cases
waged by pro se plaintiffs comprise less than 1% of all paid claims. See Charles Silver & David
A. Hyman, Access to Justice in a World Without Lawyers: Evidence from Texas Bodily Injury
Claims, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 357, 364 (2010).
24. Of course, matters are a bit more complicated. Large economic damages, which are increasingly common among those who suffer permanent injuries requiring expensive lifetime
medical treatments, are not subject to a cap on noneconomic damages. This increases the value
of such cases, relative to those in which noneconomic damages predominate. And noneconomic
damages predominate among non-working women, children, and the elderly.
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In sum, all of this justice-talk has had no apparent impact on access
to legal services for victims of medical malpractice. There is no evidence to suggest more of the same will change that. In part, this is
because bar leaders refuse to admit that some of the causes lie close to
home—in the restrictions imposed by state bars on the manner and
means by which legal services can be delivered, including harsh penalties for the unlicensed practice of law.25 But even those lucky enough
to find a lawyer quickly find that the legal system is slow, expensive,
prone to error, and fundamentally inhumane. To add insult to injury
(and to the baseline of non-compensation and under-compensation of
those suffering injury), the legal system also does a spectacularly mediocre job of deterring medical error.
To repeat, it seems unlikely that more justice-talk will remedy any
of these ills. We know of no state that is considering a wholesale
rollback of its tort reforms, and we know of many that seem inclined
to pile more lawsuit restrictions on top of those already in place. In
pro-reform states like Texas, it is arguably worse to maintain the fiction that medical malpractice victims can obtain justice through the
tort system than it would be to concede the reality that they often
cannot.
Rather than more justice-talk, we should find a new way to talk
about these issues, and a different strategy for addressing the underlying problems. For example, tort reform advocates often assert that
liability is an inefficient substitute for first-party insurance coverage of
accident-related losses. Perhaps it is time to take them at their word
and explore the possibility of making new forms of first-party coverage available for tort-related injuries. Alternatively, maybe it is time
to “make a deal,” swapping federal tort reform (which would cover
the nineteen states that do not currently have a cap on noneconomic
or total damages, and could standardize the varying caps in the other
thirty-one states) in exchange for physician acceptance of payment reform, public accountability for performance, and practice
reorganization.26
IV. CONCLUSION
Each of the developments highlighted in this Article has affected
the basic economics of plaintiff-side medical malpractice litigation. In
25. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice Through the Corporate Practice of Law (Univ. of S. Cal. Gould Sch. of Law, Center in Law, Economics, and Organization Research Papers Series, No. C12-16, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2183978.
26. William M. Sage & David A. Hyman, Let’s Make A Deal: Trading Malpractice Reform for
Health Reform, HEALTH AFF. (forthcoming 2013) (on file with authors).
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combination their effect has been devastating. To the extent we have
relied on medical malpractice to compensate negligently injured patients and deter negligent treatment, the developments highlighted in
this Article indicate it is long past time to look elsewhere.
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